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Abstract
This study examined the effects of being given either a handicap or
psychological crutch during task performance on the self-concept and
subsequent performance. Success or failure at the initial task was
also manipulated. Subjects who succeeded with a crutch or failed
with a handicap were III a state of attributional ambiguity for their
previous performance. This uncertainty led to subsequent
performance and self-concept deficits, but no conclusive differences
in self-esteem or affective measures. Using handicaps and crutches
may then serve to protect self-esteem, while likewise negatively
affecting performance and overall sel~-concept.
--------------------------
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Chapter One Introduction
Recent theorists have argued that using cognitive strategies
(such as excuses and self-handicaps) to explain individual failure will
protect an individual's tenuous self-esteem. When faced with
uncertainty, individuals avoid possible future negative and anxiety
provoking evaluations by creating alternative explanations for that
performance. However, little research has been done to determine
the exact effects of using these cognitive strategies on the content of
the self-concept itself. Mello & Wurf (1991) found that using
strategies such as self-handicaps and psychological crutches seems to
create cognitive confusion about the self, which may in turn have
negative effects. The current study reexamines how using two
specific cognitive strategies (self-handicaps and psychological
crutches) affects the content and certainty of the self-concept.
Cognitive strategies such as self-handicaps and psychological
crutclies are thought to act like "buffers" or excuses that help to
protect the self-concept from· potential negativity. These strategies
act like "band-aids" or bandages, protecting a "wounded" and
negative self-concept from the possibility of harm and adversity. For
example, Tice and Baumeister (1990) found that people with high
self-esteem behaviorally self-handicapped their upcommg
performance on a task of uncertain outcome (by reducing practice
time on a game) in order to protect their impressions on others. In
this case, it would seem that having an excuse for failure can
somehow buffer or protect an individual from harm -- the bandage
has held firm. However, it may be the case that, at times, using these
2
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strategies may have detrimental effects on the self-concept due to
uncertainty. Ambiguous and uncertain attributions made about the
self may in fact cause harm to the cognitive representations we have
of ourselves -- the bandage has allowed harmful substances to enter.
Self-handicaps and crutches can cause individuals to make
internal evaluative attributions about their own ability and
competence, which in turn affects their overall self-concept of ability.
If these specific strategies produce uncertain feelings about the self-
concept, subsequent adverse effects on the content and certainty of
the self-concept, and self-esteem levels may result, in a cyclical
manner. Figure 1 summarizes these effects.
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE
(e9 self-concept certainty)
INTERPRETATION
OF EVENTS
(e9 attributions)
COPING STRATEGIES
FOR DEALING
WITH EVENTS __
(e9 crutches and
handicaps)
Figure 1: The role of coping strategies in the interpretation of events
---- - ;~
Previous research focusing on self-concept clarity and certainty
does suggest that low clarity and/or certainty may have detrimental
effects on both self-esteem and performance levels (following
Campbell, 1990). By examining the process mediating cognitive
strategies and self-concept certainty/clarity, we hope to show how
and when using excuses can sometimes backfire on the individual.
In order to accomplish this, a discussion of cognitive strategies
and attributions will be presented. A brief review of the self-
concept content and certainty/clarity literature will then follow.
Finally, the expectations and findings of our study will then be
introduced and discussed.
A. Cognitive Strategies
1. Self-handicapping
One of the cognitive strategies which may be employed by an
individual to maintain a positive and/or certain self-concept is self-
handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978). Self-handicapping is
specifically defined as an attempt to reduce anxiety or a threat to
one's esteem by seeking out or creating inhibitory factors to interfere
with performance, thus providing an explanation for potential failure
(Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985). By developing a self-handicap,
individuals now have an "excuse" for their failure. Thus, they are
then able to maintain a higher level of self-esteem and level of
competence and/or ability (Harris et aI., 1986). In essence, these
individuals are attempting to deflect the blame for their perceived
personal inadequacies from internal to external factors (Baumeister
et aI., 1990).
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A self-handicap can serve as a kind of excuse for the
individual. People are motivated to accept credit for their successes,
and to deny the blame for failure (the self-serving bias). This
pattern may have benefits for the individual since excuses
effectively shift 'J;legative causal attributions away from internal
\
sources, to more e~rnal sources. This allows these individuals to
maintain a more posi~e sense of self (Snyder & Higgins, 1988;
Snyder & Wicklund, 1981). Likewise, there is a shifting of causal
attributions for positive personal outcomes towards internal sources.
A self-handicap takes on the role of a "scapegoat" for the person
allowing attributions for failure to be placed on this impediment, not
I
themselves.
The individual who uses a self-handicap utilizes Kelley's (1971)
principle of discounting and augmenting. Discounting would occur
when an individual's performance is affected by uncertain
attributions, thereby making the individual, or more specifically
his/her ability, neither more positive nor more negative. Through
the process of augmentation, we would attribute a positive
performance to the individual themselves, thereby making the
ability more positive to these individuals. When one performs
poorly, or fails, the individual's ability is discounted as a result of a
causal factor (the self-handicap) which serves as an impediment to
the person's performance. Conversely, in the case of success, the
individual's ability is augmented, or made more positive, since the
success occurred in the presence of the impediment (self-handicap)
and so the success can be attributed to the individual's own ability
(Snyder & Smith, 1982).
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Minimally, the self-handicap should not reflect an attribute
that seems related to low ability, and maximally the ideal self-
handicap should. give every appearance of interfering with
performance while at the same time serving as a minimal
impediment to performance. It is not that the self-handicapper
actually wants to fail, but they do want something to fall back on in
case they should fail. Sometimes the handicap the individual chooses
serves as a self-sabotage to the person, and actually causes them to
fail. But since the handicap was present at the time of failure, the
individual's self-image should remain protected. Self-handicaps may
then function as an excuse, possessing positive benefits for the
excuse giver (Snyder & Higgins, 1988), but further research is
needed to clarify this.
Since self-handicaps serve the function of protecting one's self-
esteem, one might believe that the lower one's self-esteem, the more
likely one would self-handicap. However, individuals who are most
likely to self-handicap are not those who have entirely negative self-
concepts, or extremely low self-esteem. On the contrary, people who
self-handicap are those individuals who possess fragile and unstable
self-concepts, but who also succeed from time to time, and thus have
something to protect -- in other words, there is uncertainty about
their ability (Jones & Berglas, 1978). It is also the case that
individuals are most likely to self-handicap when the event is
important to them (Jones & Berglas, 1978). For example, Harris and
Snyder (1986) examined the effects of self-esteem certainty on self-
handicapping. The specific self-handicap used was lack of effort, or
practice time, and self-reported anxiety levels. For subjects in the
6
low self-esteem certainty condition, the subjects lower anxiety was
also associated with lower practice time, and with fewer problems
being solved compared to the high self-esteem certain subjects. This
may prove that people who are more likely to self-handicap also
possess low self-esteem and uncertain self-esteem or self-concepts.
2. Psychological crutches
The second, but seemingly opposite, self-defeating strategy is
the concept of psychological crutches, which refers to an action or
verbal claim about factors that facilitate one's performance on a task.
An example would occur when a person attributes success on a test
like the GREIs to taking a preparatory class, rather than' his/her own
intellectual ability. In this example, the preparatory class becomes
,
the psychological crutch on which the individual can "lean on" as
reason for their success, thereby alleviating anxiety for future
performances.
Crutches can be used as a means to cope with stress when an
individual is brought up in a stressful environment, such as when
people seek to escape stressful situations (home life) by retreating
into mental illness or using drugs and alcohol (Jurich et aI, 1985).
Self-defeating behaviors begin to emerge as an important means to
an end -- the end of stress, illness and unhappiness. It is therefore
apparent that people do engage in self-defeating or destructive acts
at certain times, usually in an effort to avoid negative affect or to
protect their self-esteem (Baumeister & Scher, 1988). However,
unlike other related behaviors which "harm" the individual or
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involve maladaptive responses, crutches can have a "helpful" or
adaptive function for the individual.
Kelley's (1971) attribution theory can also be interpreted III
relation to psychological crutches. When one performs well, or
succeedS, the individual's ability is discounted as a result of a causal
factor (the psychological crutch) which serves as an assistance to the
person's performance. In the case of failure, 1he individual's ability
is augmented, or made more negative, since the failure occurred in
the presence of the assistance (crutch) and so the-failure-is-at-t-rioot-ed
to the individual's own ability (Snyder & Smith, 1982), causing them
to feel more negative.
Individuals using a psychological crutch are in fact hoping to
improve their performance, however, this may sometimes backfire
on them causing more negative feelings to arise. . In opposition to the
self-handicap's effects, the "unintended consequence" 'of a
psychological crutch is to discount abilit as a determina of a goo
performance. Because of the self-defeating nature of psychological
crutches, our hypothesis is that the use of this strategy should have
debilitating effects on the person's self-concept of ability.
B. The Self-Concept: A Cognitive Approach
The self-concept is a personal schematic system that organizes
and guides our processing of self-relevant information (Markus,
1977; Markus & Wurf, 1987). The self-concept plays an important
role in guiding or developing what behaviors a person chooses or
wishes to enact (Markus & Wurf, 1987), while also mediating and
regulating this behavior -- it is therefore "dynamic" (Markus & Wurf,
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1987). { Since this self-knowledge guides our future actions, it would
be beneficial· to understand the content, stability and change of this
self-knowledge in order to increase our understanding of human
behavior.
The self was once believed to be relatively stable or
unchangeable, but it is now apparent that the self-concept can be
flexible (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Individuals often have different
perceptions of themselves in different situations, and when involved
with different people. The feelings individuals have about their own
selves can change in these situations, as well as their perceptions of
others. Thus the self is not entirely static, because at times some
changes are apparent to allow the necessary self-knowledge to be
accessed. The self-concept is then considered a relatively complex
and multifaceted structure (Epstein, 1980; Schlenker, 1980; Carver
and Scheir, 1981; Rogers, 1981; Greenwald, 1982; Markus & Sentis,
1982; Markus, 1983; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom &
Cantor, 1984; Markus & Wurf, 1987), since our representations about
ourselves can adapt· and change when the situation is appropriate.
Not only can individuals alter their self-images, but individuals
can also differ in how certain or clear they are of these self-images.
Therefore, individuals can differ in the degree of certainty or clarity
of the self-concept. Self-concept certainty refers to the extent to
which the information or beliefs contained within our self-schemas
are clearly defined, internally consistent and temporally stable
(Campbell, 1991). Campbell (1990) has argued that if individuals
possess a poorly articulated self-concept, they then become more
dependent on and susceptible to external factors that carry self-
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relevant information. Lack of self-concept clarity may then lead to
attribution and performance deficits, since the influence of these
external cues may interfere with the regular course of a person's
thoughts and actions. For example, the more certainty a person has
about self-attributes, the greater their positive affect and self-
esteem (Campbell et aI, 1991; Campbell, 1990; Baumgardner, 1990).
Self-concept certainty is a function of clarity, how clear a
person's view of the self is, and short-term stability, whether the
person sees the self in a consistent way over short pmooLO'-Lf-'tu.JimLJ.J.J.,Le _
(Arnold & Masterson, 1987). Kelley (1971) believed certainty is
influenced by the amount and consistency of evidence people receIve
about themselves across time and across interactions with
individuals. Thus, certainty is related to the amount of information
individuals have about themselves, to the consistency of this
information, and to the extremity of the beliefs themselves.
People who are highly certain of a self-view seek out feedback
that supports their view, thus certainty serves to stabilize the self
(Pelham, 1991). This allows these indjviduals to isolate themselves
from sources of self-concept change (Pelham, 1991). Likewise
individuals who are highly uncertain about their beliefs may be
more susceptible to others' influences, which could lead to negative
consequences. According to Pelham (1991), people not only hold
onto specific self-views with varying degrees of confidence but these
self-views (or self-concept) may also hold varying degrees of
consequence for the person. In other words, the degree of certainty
with which people hold their self-concepts, beliefs and self-esteem,
can influence them in their future thoughts and actions, since
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uncertainty may lead individuals to protect these uncertain self-
views in some way.
As an example of this, Mello and Wurf (1991) found that when
people are made to feel uncertain about the causes of their successes,
they made fewer internal attributions and had lower subsequent
performance than did subjects who were induced to be relatively
more certain of their ability. Kimble et al. (1990) have also found
that self-esteem uncertainty leads individuals to engage in self-
protective actions, i.e. self-handicapping, in order to protect their
self-concepts. Thus, observing how a person's self-concept certainty
changes as they engage in certain cognitive actions and strategies is -
important. This should then further our understanding of how these
strategies directly influence us.
C. Hypotheses
Both self-handicapping and psychological crutches are extolled
as beneficial and positive strategies for an individual. As
"achievement strategies", they help the individual to overcome
anxiety and self-doubts, thus eliminating the possibility for
individual failu~e (Cantor, 1990). However, since this is a complex,
multifaceted process, an individual does not rely on cognition alone
when using strategies -- other systems and resources are also
involved, which may in turn interfere with the "first-aid" qualities of
these strategies (Cantor, 1990). Little research has focused on
examining the direct effects of using these strategies on the self-
concept of an individual. It may well be the case that using cognitive
strategies to cope with certain situations may not protect the self-
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concept, but may in fact be injurious to the individual, and the
impression management associated with these strategies (Luginbuhl
& Palmer, 1991). Therefore, discovering when these strategies are
positive and when they are negative would be an important addition
to self-enhancement/self-handicapping literature.
Specifically, we hope to answer three questions: what effect
does the certainty or uncertainty that one was responsible for
success or failure have on attributions, self-concept, self-esteem,
affect, and performance; does providing people with a handicap allow
for the augmentation (after success) or discounting (after failure) of
the role of the self-concept above and beyond the effects of
certainty; and does providing people with a crutch allow for the
discounting (after success) or augmenting (after failure) of the role of
the self-concept above and beyond the effects of being uncertain.
When an individual is completely ,certain that they were the
cause of their performance; the individual's self-concept should be
augmented or increased when they succeed, and decreased or made
more negative when they fail. In this instance, the individual should
feel more positive or more negative than subjects who were
uncertain of their performance, since no other source could have
affected their performance in any way.
When some uncertainty or ambiguity exists about the cause of
a success or a failure, the individuals' self-concept should be
augmented or increased when they succeed, and decreased or made
more negative when they fail. However, since subjects are not
completely certain of the cause of their performances, they will not
feel as positive or negative as subjects who are more certain of their
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performance. Uncertainty about the causes of one's performance
may then produce uncertain or "mixed" self-concepts.
". The use of handicaps and crutches should modify how certain
or uncertain one is about the cause of performance. Based on our
previous experiment (Mello & Wurf, 1991), and following Kelley's
theory (1971), we expect to find that the self-concept should be
augmented, or made more reflective of positive attributes, when
success is presented to an individual if they are given a self-
handicap. If someone is presented with a self-handicap which
supposedly will impede their performance, this person should feel
more positive when he/she succeeds, and for this reason his/her
self-concept becomes augmented. In contrast, when the individual
fails he/she should feel neither more positive nor negative. Instead
his/her self-concept should be mostly or primarily unaffected Jor
unchanged, because he/she will attribute the failure to the handicap
(external) and not to one's own ability (internal) in a task. However,
-----~since_f-aiHng---i-n-t-he--presenee--6f-a--handiea-p_produces-uncertai·~llhty:r--'Oa~s-t-rto'-----
the real cause of the failure, increased uncertainty and negativity in
the self-concept may result.
When someone is presented with a psychological crutch, this
crutch should supposedly increase or facilitate his/her performance.
For this reason, when individuals are told they have succeeded, they
will attribute this success (external) to the crutch and not to their
own ability (internal), therefore their self-concept should primarily
remain unaffected or unchanged. But again, due to the uncertainty
involved, a more uncertain self-concept may result. However, if the
individual fails, their self-concept should become more negative
13
because attributions about their failure will be directed more
internally towards their own ability.
Figure 2 summarizes our expectations for each group. To test
these effects, this study will divide subjects into four instructional
groups (Crutch, Handicap, Uncertain Effect, and No Effect) differing in
degree of certainty of ability. These groups will further be divided
by providing subjects with either success or failure feedback
(totaling eight different groups). Therefore, we hope to demonstrate
that the use of handicaps and crutches will produce uncertainty and
ambiguity about competence of ability. This, in turn, should produce
a more uncertain self-concept, which could also lead to other
performance and attribution deficits.
Figure 2: Effects of Success- or Failure on Instructional Groups
Crutch Handicap Uncertain No Effect
/ ,/~r v, / , iSuccess
discount increase increase increase
Failure tJJ t tt
decrease discount decrease decre~se
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Chapter Two •• Method
Design.
G The design of the experiment is a 2 x 4 between-subjects
factorial design, in which the independent variables were:
performance outcome (success or failure); and musical effect
instructions (self-handicap, psychological crutch, uncertain effect and
no effect).
Subjects.
161 undergraduate students were rarrdomly selected from
Lehigh University's Introductory Psychology subject pool to serve as
subjects in this experiment.
Procedure.
Subjects were tested individually by one of three female
experimenters. Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a computer
terminal. The experimenter then informed each subject that he/she
was participating in a study that was concerned with whether or not
subliminal messages can affect an individual in some way. Subjects
were given a false cover story stating that a part of a test called the
"Culture Fair Test" would be used to compare two groups of students:
one group who listened to a subliminal message, and the other group
who did not listen to a subliminal message. Subjects were told that
this test measured individual mental abilities in a way that reduced
as much as possible, the influence of verbal, cultural and educational
differences. The actual task involved a series of figural matrices or
15
analogies, figural series completions and figural classification .
problems very similar to the problems used in the actual Culture Fair
Test of g (Cattell & Cattell, 1960), but not directly taken from this
test (see Appendix 1). Subjects were then given several pages and
problems of the actual Culture Fair Test of g to read over and
examine.
Handicap/Crutch Manipulation.
Subjects were then told that their performance on this test
would be measured while they listened to a subliminal message, an
this would be compared to the performance of a group of students
who did not listen to the message. The same music was provided for
all subjects, but the subjects were instructed that the music had one
of four different dfects on their performance, depending on which
group they were randomly assigned to. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of four scenarios:
Group 1 (the psychological crutch group)
"The music you will listen to contains a subliminal message
behind it that will repeat a message stating that the music will help
listeners to relax. This message should help you to relax,
concentrate better, and in turn this should help your performance."
Group 2 (self-handicap group)
"The music you will listen to contains a subliminal message
behind it that will repeat a message stating that the music will ~elp
listeners to relax. However, this relaxation message may make you
16
sleepy or tired. This may make it hard to concentrate and may
do
actually hurt your performance."
.
Group 3 (uncertain group)
"The music you will listen to contains a subliminal message
behind it that will repeat a message stating that the music will help
listeners to relax. However, we are not certain how this will affect
you it might help you to concentrate better or it might make you feel
sleepy and tired, so we are uncertain as to how the message will
affect your performance."
Group 4 (no effect group)
"The music you will listen to contains a subliminal message
behind it that will repeat a message stating that the music will help
listeners to relax, but being relaxed should really have no effect on
your performance."
Subjects now answered some preliminary questions regarding their
oeTiefSln subHiiiinal-messa-ges Defore tneyD.eard the tape dunng the
four experimental trials. Specifically, subjects were asked, to rate
how effective they believed subliminal messages were in general;
what effect they expected the message to have on them; and how
valid a measure they believed the Culture Fair Test was of their
mental abilities.
Success/Failure Manipulation.
After the subjects completed the subliminal message
manipulation check, each subject completed three blocks of trials,
with feedback given after each trial. A total of 30 problems (10
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problems per block) was given, with 30 seconds allotted for each
problem. In: order to manipulate success or failure, half of the
subjects were given eight solvable plus two unsolvable problems
(success), while the other half received eight unsolvable and two
solvable problems (failure) per trial. An unsolvable problem was a
problem with no one correct answer. All problems were pretested
for difficulty and solvability. Subjects were then presented the first
of three learning blocks consisting of 10 problems and were allotted
a maximum of 30 sec for each problem. After solving each problem,
subjects were asked to indicate how certain they were of the
correctness of their response. This served as a manipulation check
on the contingency of the subjects responses.
Upon completion of each block of the task, the music was
turned off. The subject's prearranged performance on the preceding
10 problems was reported to him or her, by the experimenter
comparing the subject's answers to a prearranged answer key as the
subject watched. A successful performance was reported as seven,
eight, or nine answers correct, while an unsuccessful performance
was reported as only two, three, or four answers correct.
Dependent Variables! "ME" vs. "NOT ME" Adjectives.
At the conclusion of the third block, each subject's self-
perception was monitored. This was accomplished by the subject
choosing whether or not a list of 70 adjectives (see Appendix 2) was
considered characteristically "ME" or "NOT ME" by pressing the
related button on a computer monitor box (following Markus, 1977).
The list contained both positive and negative attributes, or more
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specifically, those adjectives typical of a successful, high achieving
and outgoing person, or an unsuccessful, low achieving and shy
person (following Kuiper & Derry, 1981).
When subjects were done with the list of adjectives, a final
block of problems was presented with music. In this last trial, all
problems were solvable. This was done in order to determine exact
performance lev,~ls after the feedback was given. The subjects were
not told how they performed on this final trial.
Upon completion of the final task, the subjects were given a
questionnaire containing the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965), Derogatis Affect Balance Scale (Derogatis, 1977),
Campbell Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell, 1990), and questions
regarding subjects' attributions and beliefs in their performance and
feedback. Specifically, these questions asked subjects to rate how
well they believed they performed on the four trials; how
integratively complex they believed they were; how hard they tried;
how well they concentrated during the trials; and how much their
performance was affected by either internal causes (their own skill,
their effort, concentration, alertness, control) or external causes (the
task difficulty, tape, luck, subliminal message). Finally, subjects were
debriefed (by oral and written feedback) thoroughly, regarding the
exact nature of the task and false feedback given once they had
completed the questionnaire.
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Chapter 3 •• Results
Instructional Manipulation Checks
Several questions were asked to check for the effectiveness of
the feedback and instructions manipulations; means for these
questions are listed in Table 1.
As a manipulation check on the success/failure feedback,
subjects' perceptions of their performance was looked at. Subjects in
the Success condition reported that they believed they did better on
-----~aH-f_our trials and-----uetievecltliey were better at solving figural
problems overall than the Failure subjects.
Table 1
Means for the Success/Failure Manipulation Checks by Group
Groups
Questions Success Failure df* F-value p
Performance on ftr-sl
3 trials? 7.11 3.54 153 314.70 .0001
Performance on final
trial? 7.03 5.53 151 39.92 .0001
Ability to solve
figural problems? 7.11 5.57 135 22.14 .0001
Note. Performance ratings were based on a 10 point Likert scale
with l=far below average, and 10=far above average.
* numerator df=1.
A manipulation check on the "subliminal message" instructions
was also conducted before subjects actually listened to the tape. The
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means for these two questions are presented in Table 2. Subjects
were first asked whether they believed subliminal messages could
have any effect on performance, with subjects indicating a moderate
degree of belief in the possible effectiveness of subliminal messages
(M=2.93 on a 5-point scale). Second, subjects were asked what kind
of effect, hindering or helping, they expected the message to have on
their performance. A group difference was found F(3,152)=6.192,
p=.0005, in which the Crutch group (M=3.29) believed the message
would most luilit their performance, followed by the Uncertain group
(M=3.05), the No Effect group (M=2.93), and the Handicap group
(M=2.73) which believed the message WOlla most hinder their
performance.
Additionally, a post-experimental question found that after
success, the Crutch group (M=3.35 on a IO-point scale) thought that
the message had influenced their performance more than did the
Uncertain group (M=2.98), F(I,76)=3.33, p<.08, but no differences
----------...wme:iTr~e':foill.rrt regardmg how helpful/hindering the tape actually was,
F(1,76)=2-;-20,p>-;-l(} (overall means are included in Table 2).
Therefore, although there was high believability regarding the
effects of the subliminal message prior to experimentation, the
believed effects were greatly reduced after the experiment was
completed, perhaps due to post-hoc attributions.
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Table 2
Means for the Message Manipulation Checks by Group _
Instructional Groups
Question Crutch Handicap Uncertain No Effect
What effect will
message have? 3.29 2.73 3.05 2.93
How much did the
message influence 3.35 3.65 .2.98 3.75
your performance?
The tape I heard.. 5.13 4.63 4.58 5.13
Note. Question 1 was rated on a 5-point scale, where l=hinder and
5 help.
Question 2 was rated on a 10-point scale, where l=not at all and
10=extremely.
Question 3 was rated on a 10-point scale, where l=hindered
performance and 10=helped performance.
Analysis Strategy
Planned comparisons were performed to find differences
between the four instructional groups for performance, questionnaire
data and self-concept measures. These analyses were performed
separately after success and after failure, since we were interested in
the effects of instructional condition on the subjects, not on the
effects of success or failure per se. These specific questions will now
be looked at separately for success and failure.
Results after success:
We were interested in examining three separate questions about the
effects of the instructional manipulations. Specifically,
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· (1) What effect does the certainty or uncertainty that one was
responsible for this success have on attributions, self-concept, self-
esteem, affect, and performance?
(2) Does providing people with a handicap allow for the
augmentation of the role of the self-concept above and beyond the
effects of certainty?
(3) Does providing people with a crutch allow for the discounting
of the role of the self-concept above and beyond the effects of being
uncertain?
Table 3 indicates the specific comparisons performed.
Table 3
Planned Comparisons Performed after Success by Instructional Group
Instructional Groups
Attribution
Table 4 lists group means for the attributional measures.
Subjects were given a post-experimental questionnaire asking them
to make internal and external attributions about their past
performance, etc. Seven internal and seven external questions were
condensed into total internal and external attribution measures. No
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significant differences were found between groups on the three
specific comparisons performed, on either the condensed internal
attributions, F(1,76)=0.37 - 1.15, p>.10, or condensed external
attributions, F(1,76)=0.32 - 2.83, p>.10.
Table 4
Means for Attributional Effects/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Attribu tion
Internal
attribu tions
External
attributions
Handicap.
6.42
4.15
No Effect Uncertain
5.99 5.91
4.59 3.90
Crutch
6.03
4.54
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater attribution of performance to
internal or external sources. Maximum score =10.
_~ S_eJl__&sJ~_eJIl L~ ffec t
Subjects were given both the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale and
Derogatis Affect Balance scale to determine their affective level
following the experiment (see Table 5 for group means). No
differences were found in global esteem as measured by the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale on any of the three comparisons,
F(1,77)=0.005 - 0.43, p>.10. The Derogatis Affect Balance Scale
(anxiety, depression, anger, joy, remorse, satisfaction, vigor and
passion) was condensed into a total positive and total negative
affective response, but no significant comparison differences were
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found between groups for either positive affect, F(1,77)=1.34 - 2.10,
p>.10, or negative affect, F(1,77)=0.09 - 3.115, p>.08. Generally,
success subjects had moderately high self-esteem (M=33.63), and
experienced greater positive affect (M=5.80) than negative affect
(M=1.62).
Table 5
Means for Self-Esteem & Affect/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Measure
Self-esteem
Positive affect
Negative affect
Handicap
33.35
04.45
01.45
No Effect
33.25
05.80
01.65
Uncertain
33.85
05.70
02.30
Crutch
34.05
07.19
01.10
Note. Self-esteem scores range from 1 (very low) to 40 (very high).
Higher affective numbers equal greater number of responses.
Performance
Performance was determined by number of problems correct
on Trial 4, the final trial which contained all solvable problems.
Table 6 presents the number correct for each group. On Trial 4, the
Handicap and No Effect groups performed better than the Crutch and
Uncertain groups, F(1,77)=16.65, p=.OOOl. These results are
consistent with our hypotheses, since it was the groups who had
greater attributional ambiguity regarding their previous
performances that performed the worst on this final trial. Also on
the final trial, the Uncertain group outperformed the Crutch group,
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F(1,77)=5.31, p=.02. This also fits with out hypothesis because the
crutch allowed for discounting with regards to one's own self as a
cause of performance (see Figure 3 in back of paper for comparison
of all eight groups). There was no difference found when comparing
the Handicap group to the No Effect group, F(1,77)= .10, p>.10.
Table 6
Means for Performance on Trial 4/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Performance Handicap No Effect Uncertain Crutch
# Problems
" correct
7.70 7.80 7.20 6.50
Note. Maximum number equals 10 problems correct.
Self-Concept
Self-Concept Clarity: Subjects were also presented with a
self-concept clarity scale to measure their level of certainty/clarity
of the self-concept (means for this measure are listed in Table 7). No
differences were found on the three comparisons performed in the
self-concept clarity measure, F(1,77)=.006 - .380, p>.10. Overall,
Success subjects had a moderate self-concept clarity rating
(M=65.20).
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Table 7
Means for Self-Concept Clarity/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Score Handicap No Effect Uncertain Crutch
SC clarity 65.98 64.65 65.98 66.50
Note. Maximum self-concept clarity score = 100.
------M-elN-ot-M--e-Respunses: Subjects were asked to respond Me or Not
Me to a list of 70 adjectives (35 positive and 35 negative) prior to
. the final trial. Mter performing the three comparisons, no
differences were found in number of responses of saying Me to
either the positive words, F(1,77)=.01 - .66, p>.lO, or the negative
words, F(1,77)=.001 - 1.49, p>.lO; and saying Not Me to either the
positive words, F(1,77)=.18 - .39, p>.lO, or the negative words,
_____--£F-{1;n-j=.-1-3---l.24,pHG~-a-ble_8_summarizes_tlre1neIDIsIort1Ie
groups: subjects were more likely to respond Me to positive words
and Not Me to negative words than the reverse, but there were no
differences in means between the four groups.
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Table 8
Means for MelNot Me Responses/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Response Handicap No Effect Uncertain Crutch
Me Pos 30.10 29.90 30.30 30.10
Me Neg 06.65 05.10 04.70 04.90
Not Me Pos 05.80 06.45 05.90 05.25
Not Me Neg 30.95 28.55 29.10 29.75
Note. Numbers indicate average number of responses f~r positive
----------dcand--1legative w.ord~Maxinlllm number=35 positive and 35 negative
words.
Certainty of Responses: Following their Me/Not Me responses,
, subjects were then asked to indicate how certain they were of their
previous response. No comparison differences were found in
number of certainty responses of saying Me to either the positive
words, F(1,76)=.001 - .10, p>.10, or the negative words, F(1,76)=.34 -
1.03, p>.10; and number of certainty responses of saying Not Me to
either the positive words, F(1,77)=.01 - .32, p:>.10, or the negative .
words, F(1,77)=.009 - 1.38, p>.10. Table 9 summarizes the results:
subjects were more certain when responding Me to positive words,
and Not Me to Negative words than the reverse, but there were no
differences between the four groups.
28
Table 9
Means for Certainty Responses/Success Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Response Handicap No Effect Uncertain Crutch
Me Pos 095.45 095.60 099.80 100.35
Me Neg 019.00 014.75 013.10 015.55
Not Me Pos 016.00 018.30 015.55 015.00
Not Me Neg 103.60 094.55 099.00 102.55
Note. Higher scores indicate greater certainty.
Results after Failure:
Again, we were interested in examining three separate questions
after failure about the effects of the instructional manipulations.
Specifically,
(1) What effect does the certainty or uncertainty that one was
responsible for this failure have on attributions, self-concept, self-
esteem, affect, and performance?
(2) Does providing people with a handicap allow for the discounting
of the role of the self-concept above arid beyond the effects of
uncertainty? Does failing with a handicap "buffer" the self-concept?
(3) Does providing people with a crutch allow for the augmenting of
the role of the self-concept above and beyond the effects of being
certain? Does failing :with a crutch make failure more devastating?
Table 10 presents the specific comparisons performed.
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Table 10
Planned Comparisons Performed after Failure by Instructional Group
A-----------------------------Instructional Groups
Role Uncertain
certain. - 1
discount 1
augment 0
Attribution
Crutch
1
o
- 1
No Effect
1
o
1
Handicap
-1
-1
o
Table 11 summarizes the group means for internal and
external attributions. Subjects who were uncertain about their past
performances, were also less likely to attribute their performance to
internal sources. Planned comparisons found that the Crutch and No
Effect groups felt their performance was due more to internal
sources than the Handicap and Uncertainp'0up~ (~~1!P_s w!!~
attribute ambiguity), F(I,75)=5.93, p<.05. No differences were found
on the other two planned comparisons, F(1,75)=.13 - 1.37, p>.lO.
Being uncertain about failure, i.e. previous performances, may
sometimes lead to uncertain or less internal attributions. No
differences were found between the groups regarding the extent of
their external attributions on any of the three comparisons,
,--
F(1,75)=.001 - 0.39, p>.lO.
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Table 11
Means for Attributional EffectslFailure Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Attribution
Internal
Attributions
External
Attributions
Crutch
5.21
4.38
No Effect
4.81
4.36
Uncertain Handicap
4.58 4.64
4.22 4.21
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater attribution of performance to
internal or external sources.
self-Esteem/Affect
Table 12 presents the means for self-esteem and affective
measures for the four groups. No differences were found in global
esteem as measuRd by the Rosenberg Selilsteem.--Sjcali~lCIlJSS.-aJJ----------l
---- ------
three comparis~ns, F(1,76)=0.04 - .86,.P?10. Failure ~u!Jjects .hact a
moderately high self-esteem rating (M=34.41).
Based on the condensed positive and negative affect scores of
the Derogatis Mfect Balance Scale, no differences were found across
the three comparisons in the mean positive affect, F(1,76)= 0.55 -
1.94, p>.10, and negative affect, F(1,76)= 0.02 - .74 p>.10 between
groups. Failure subjects generally experienced greater positive affect
(M=3.96) than negative affect (M=1.84)
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Table 12
Means for Self-Esteem & Affect/Failure Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Measure Crutch No Effect Uncertain Handicap
Self-esteem 33.95 35.05 34.20 34.45
Positive affect 04.40 ;- 03.00 04.80 03.65
Negative affect 02.30 01.65 01.7$ --"01.65
Note. Maximum self-esteem score=40 (high). Affective means
-----~indicate____IlUlllber-()f_a-ff~¥e_____r_espense~s. ----------------------
Performance
There were no significant differences across all three
comparisons between groups in performance when subjects were
given failure feedback, F(1,76)=.05 - 1.88, p>.10 (means are listed in
Table 13). However, it was generally those subjects who were in a
state of attributional ambiguity who performed worse on this final
trial.
Table 13
Means for Performance/Failure Condition By Instructional Groups
Instructional Groups
Performance
# Problems
correct
Crutch
7.25
No Effect Uncertain Handicap
6.95 6.70 6.60
Note. Maximum number equals 10 problems correct.
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Self-Concept
Self~Concept Clarity: Means for self-concept clarity are
presented in Table 14. Generally, when subjects failed, the Crutch
and No Effect groups had a higher self-concept clarity rating than the
Handicap and Uncertain groups, F(1,76)=5.52, p=.02. Thus,
uncertainty about past performances may lead to uncertainty about
the self-concept. Making excuses may only serve to protect the self-
concept under successful conditions, but not under failure conditions.
No differences were found when performing the other two
comparisons, F(1,75)=.04 - 2.71, p>.10.
Table 14
Means for Self-Concept Clarity/Failure Condition By Instructional
Groups
Score Crutch
Instructional Groups
No Effect Uncertain Handicap
. SC clarity 67.03 73.82 63.20 64.05
Note. Maximum self-concept clarity score=100.
Me/Not Me Responses: After performing the three planned
comparisons, no, differences were found in number of responses of
saying Me to either the positive words, F(1,76)=.35 - .55, p>.10, or the
negative words, F(1,76)=.02 - 1.95, p>.10; and Not Me to either the
positive words, F(1,76)=.34 - 1.38, p>.10, or the negative words,
F(1,76)=.06 - .71, p>.10 (means are listed in Table 15). Subjects were
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more likely to respond Me to positive words and Not Me to negative
words than the reverse, but there were no differences between the
four groups.
Table 15
Means for Me/Not Me Responses/Failure Condition By Instructional
Groups
Instructional Groups
Response
Me Pos
.Me Neg
Not Me Pos
No Me Neg
Crutch
27.05
07.95
06.75
28.25
No Effect
28.53
06.55
05.30
29.70
Uncertain
29.32
05.68
05.32
29.68
Handicap
29.35
05.65
05.85
29.15
Note. Means indicate average number of responses for positive and
negative words. Maximum number = 35 positive and 35 negative
words.
____. ~C~.~;A-l"_-I.4taui~~-sp9lls~~: NQ. differencesnwere found--wnn--etnree
comparisons in number of certainty responses of saying Me to either
the positive words, F(1,75)=.02 - 1.10, p>.10, or the negative words,
F(1,76)=.00 - 1.85, p>.lO; and number of certainty responses of
saying Not Me to either the positive words, F(1,75)=.23 - 1.51, p>.10,
or the negati~ds, F(1,75)=.001 - .786, p>.10 (means are listed In
Table 16). Subjects were more certain when responding Me to
positive words, and Not Me to Negative words than the reverse, but
there were no differences between the four groups.
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Table 16
Certainty ResponseslFailure Condition By Instructional Groups
Instructional Groups
Response Crutch No Effect Uncertain Handicap
Me Pos
Me Neg
Not Me Pos
Not Me Neg
86.00
22.85
18.80
92.70
91.70
09.25
14.15
98.40
92.27
16.11
13.42
94.05
94.10
16.00
15.25
97.30
Note. Responses were scored on a 4-point certainty scale:
--------j.l cver-y---uneertain-;-2 nncer lain; S-=-c-e-rt~alh·n..-;-7t4~--v="-e""r""y;-"c"'e-;;"jrtcna;-;in~------------:---:-
Summary of Results
Table 17a
Summary Table/Success Condition
To summarize the results, we found some evidence under
success and failure for the role of certainty/uncertainty,
augmentation and discounting. Table 17a and 17b summarizes when
our hypothesis was correct for each role separately under success
_____~aCLIncud---.L,<fa...,.i1U_ree~.--------------~
Crutch
Discounts
Roles
Handicap
Augments
m
NO
m
m
m
Certainty
m
YES
NO
NO
NO
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Note. Yes indicates evidence for the effect.
Measures
Attribu tion
Performance
Self-esteem
Affect
Self-concept
Table 17b
Summary Table/Failure Condition
Roles
Measure Certainty Handicap Crutch
Discounts Augments
Attribution YES m m
Performance YES m m
Self-esteem m m m
Affect· m m m
Self-concept YES m m
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Chapter 4·· Discussion
The goal of this study was to determine the effectiveness of
using specific cognitive strategies in preserving the beliefs
individuals make about themselves in performance situations.
Although previous research has extolled excuses for their beneficial
nature (Snyder & Higgins, 1988; Snyder et aI., 1985; Taylor, 1989),
aiding to preserve and sometimes enhance s,elf-esteem, we had
found that perhaps these excuse could have negative effects on the
self. Based-on-our--pl'evious-experiment-fM-eH-o-&--Wu-rf,1-99-1-),-weP:----
specifically expected that after success, a handicap would increase or
augment affect, self-beliefs and performance, while crutches might
decrease affective, self-Qeliefs and subsequent performance
measures. Mter failure, a handicap would have affective benefits
but detrimental effects on beliefs about oneself and subsequent
performance, whereas crutches would have more negative effects on
affect, self-beliefs and performance.
To look at these effects, we. asked SIX separate questions about
our data, three after success and three after failure. Specifically,
these questions were:
After success we asked,
(1) What effect does the certainty or uncertainty that one was
responsible for their success have on attributions, self-concept, self-
esteem, affect and performance?
In the past we found that certainty that one is the cause of
previous success led to increased attributions to skill and effort,
increased one's self-concept of ability, and enhanced positive
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emotions and performance. In this study, we found that being
certain about previous success, i.e. not being in a state of attribute
ambiguity, led subjects to make more internal, positive attributions
about their performance, and led to better performance on the final
trial. This certainty did not have an effect on the self-concept, self-
esteem or affective measures as we had found before.
(2) Does providing people with a handicap allow for the
augmentation of the role of the self-concept above and beyond the
effects of certainty?
Previously we found augmenting of the self-concept and
performance after success, but not in attributions and self-esteem
(Mello & Wurf, 1991). This study, however, found that providing
people with a handicap did not seem to lead to augmentation after
success for any of our measures.
(3) Does providing people with a crutch allow for the
discounting of the role of the self-concept above and beyond the
effects of being uncertain?
We found previously that there was no discounting effect of a
crutch after success; however, in our previous experiment the crutch
manipulation was ineffective. Different variables were then piloted
for their believability of helping/hindering performance; and the
subliminal message tape was selected as the best. Using this
manipulation, the current study found that, although there was no
specific discounting effect for the self-concept measures, there was a
performance difference. Subjects in the Success/Crutch condition
performed worse on the final trial than subjects who were in the
Success/Uncertain condition.
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Summarizing our results after success, we found that being
certain about attributions for past success led subjects to perform
better on a future performance task, while being uncertain led to
poorer performance. Certainty, however, did not seem to affect
feelings about the self.
After failure we asked,
(1) What effect does the certainty or uncertainty that one was
responsible for their failure have on attributions, self-concept, self-
esteem, affect and performance?
Our previous experiment found no effects of certainty or
uncertainty on the measures. In this study, however, we found that
being uncertain about previous failure led subjects to make more
negative attributions, have a less certain self-concept, and led to
poorer performance on the final trial. This uncertainty again did not
lead to self-esteem or affective differences.
(2) Does providing people with a handicap allow for the
discolfiftingof the role of the self-concept· above and beyond the
effects of uncertainty?
As in our previous experiment, the current study did not find
any evidence for a handicap providing a buffering effect on the self-
concept, since subjects in the Handicap condition performed as poorly
on the final trial as subjects in the Uncertain condition.
(3) Does providing people with a crutch allow for the
augmenting of the role of the self-concept above and beyond the
effects of being certain?
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Again, as in our previous experiment failing with a crutch did
not seem to make failure more devastating for subjects. This may be
due to subjects possibly internalizing the initial positive expectations
given to them for a crutch, however further research is needed to
determine if this assumption is correct.
Summarizing our results after failure, once again we found that
being certain about attributions for past performances (even if it was
a previous failure), led subjects to perform better on a future
performance task. Certainty also led to greater internal attributions,
--------
and a higher measure of self-concept clarity.
Generally, our results (from both experim~nts) demonstrate
that it was those groups who were under "attribute ambiguity"
regarding their previous success or failure who performed worse on
the final trial. Under success, the Crutch and Uncertain groups
performed worse than the Handicap and No Effect groups, while
under failure, the Handicap and Uncertain groups performed worse
than the Crutch and No· Effect groups. Being uncertain that one was
responsible for their previous performances had a definite negative
impact on future performances. This contrasts with previous
findings which found these strategies beneficial for the individual
(Snyder, 1990; Snyder & Higgins, 1988). These results therefore gIve
evidence that using cognitive strategies may not always be
beneficial, especially with regards to more cognitive measures such
as the self-concept and performance.
Although our success/failure manipulation was effective, the
effectiveness of the instructional group manipul'!tion was somewhat
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weak. Subje~ts' belief that the subliminal message would affect their
performance diminished once the experiment was over. It is hard to
determine exactly why this was so -- was the manipulation itself
ineffective, or was it a combination of the manipulation and some
other unknown factor. With either case, we may have obtained more
robust results if this manipulation had been more effective.
Therefore, although we had piloted possible manipulations, future
studies should perhaps develop more accurate measures to
determine the best handicap/crutch manipulation (or have subjects
clioose1Oftnemselves which InstructIonal group they would be in).
Few self-concept differences were found, which makes it
difficult to generalize about how cognitive strategies affect the self-
concept (especially since latencies of MelNot Me responses were not
looked at). However, since the Handicap and Uncertain groups had
lower self-concept clarity ratings than the Crutch and No Effect
groups, uncertainty caused by cognitive strategies may allow the
individual to develop less certain or clear self-concepts, especially
.after tile individual fails (but further research is-needed to verify
this).
We were able to find attributional differences between our
groups, in which uncertainty served to cause attributional
differences. After success and after failure, the groups with attribute
ambiguity (groups who were uncertain about their past
performance) were less certain about attributing their performances
to themselves, than the groups with no uncertainty.
No affective or self-esteem differences were found In this
study, although differences were found in our previous study.
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Previously we found that after success groups without attribute
ambiguity (Handicap and No Effect groups) felt more positive or
happier than groups with attribute ambiguity (Crutch and Uncertain
groups), and also had higher self-esteem. Since no differences were
found in this study, perhaps a· reevaluation of measures· should occur
in future studies. However, it may be the case that using strategies
like handicaps and crutches protects the affective aspects of the self,
not the cognitive aspects.
In summary, the use of crutches and handicaps may produce
.~----
attribute ambiguity within an individual, leading to performance
deficits. How these strategies directly affect the self-concept still
needs further research to answer the many questions resulting from
their use. With further research, crutches and handicaps may be
found to· also have negative effects on the self-concept resulting from
the attribute ambiguity these strategies cause. Not only can future
research focus on self-concept measures, but the different ways III
which subjects self-handicap (such as subjects self-selecting a
handicap vs. crutch, or-subjects being--p-re-selectea-byoeing gIven
the Self-Handicapping Scale; Rhodewalt, 1990). Although there were
not all that many specific effects of crutches and handicaps
themselves, there did seem to be moderately consistent effects of
uncertainty.
Our results demonstrate that uncertainty about past
performance (caused by using crutches and handicaps) led
individuals to perform poorly on following performance tasks. This
contradicts recent literature stating that strategies such as self-
handicaps are beneficial to the individual (Snyder & Higgins, 1988).
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However, past studies have focused mainly on strategies affectively
protecting the individual, allowing the individual to maintain their
self-esteem. This study found no differences among the groups in
either self-esteem or affect, which fits with past studies. However,
,
where our study differs is in the more cognitive aspects of the self,
I.e. the self-concept and performance measures. In these measures
we did find that the uncertainty caused by using handicaps and
crutches can be detrimental to the individual. It may be that these
strategies protect the individual only in an affective manner (such as
--------1
self-esteem and affective feelings), but not in a cognitive manner
(such as self-concept and performance _measures). Individuals may
feel good about themselves after using these handicaps and crutches,
but actual cognitive and performance deficits may still result. The
use of these strategies may not be benefi~ial to the more cognitive
aspects of the self. However, more research is needed in order to
conclude that uncertainty resulting from the use of a self-handicap IS
actually harmful to the individual. Further studies similar to this
study sliould then provide data to test a central assumption-of self-
handicapping theory, Le. how self-handicapping can have negative
and/or positive effects on the self-concept and on performance,
especially in the long-term.
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APPENDIX 1:
FIGURAL ANALOG IES
~ 18to1
as
Exampl e:
TRIAL 1
______T'---'-R~IA~L2_SERJES COt:1~-E--+-UJNS-­
Example: 6 ~ ~
TRIAL 3 FIGURAL CLASSIFICATIONS
1'--0---'1" ..
Example:
d
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APPENDIX 2:
Positive
Word Types
Negative
Achieving Bleak
Amiable Blue
Assertive Criticized
Capable Defeated
Consistent Destroyed
Energetic Dismal
Curious Downcast
Persis tent Downhearted
------~----_rForeefu11--------- DUll
In Control Foolish
Gracious Failure
Quick Forlorn
Helpful Glum
Inquiring Guilty
Humorous Heartsick
Loyal Helpless
Caring Hopeless
Neat Inadequate
Decisive Inferi or
Orderly Worthless
Organized Loser
----------~PL.]UlaL_Jy....L-flu-J1-------------ba_zJ'-------------:
Polite Melancholy
Creative Oppressed
Smart Solemn
Rational Troubled
Appealing Unlucky
Sociable Unwanted
Success Weak
Tidy Weary
Competent Incompetent
Secure Insecure
Active Passive
Confident Confused
Winner Incapable
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